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Abstract This introduction provides some background to the contributions to this
volume.
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Vagueness is a ubiquitous phenomenon in language and thought, which gives rise to
the notorious sorites paradox and related puzzles. With view to recent philosophical
theories such as epistemicism (Williamson), supervaluationism (Fine) or so-called
degree-theoretic approaches (Edgington; Smith), it is fair to say that the problem of
vagueness has taken center stage in philosophy of language, logic, and epistemol-
ogy. With formal epistemology having emerged as one of the major methodological
paradigms in contemporary analytic philosophy, it is only natural to look closer into
possible applications of probability theory to the epistemology of vague languages.
For another, the phenomenon of indeterminacy in credence judgements (broadly con-
ceived) is receiving increasing attention in formal epistemology (as well as in other
fields such as statistics, behavioural economics, or the psychology of reasoning). Con-
versely, formal frameworks of vagueness can be brought to bear on the modeling of
credal indeterminacy. This special issue offers a collection ofmost recent contributions
on the philosophy of vagueness and probability, focussing especially on probabilistic
models of vagueness, and on models of indeterminacy and vagueness in probability
judgements. It emerged from the Probability & Vagueness conference which took
place on March 20–21, 2013, at the University of Tokyo. The contributions may be
subdivided into four thematic groups.
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1. Foundations of vagueness. Vagueness has been commonly conceptualised in terms
of definite truth. According to this, a general term (such as red) is vague only if it has
borderline applications, that is, applications that are neither definitely true nor defi-
nitely false. The seeming absence of a cut-off point between true and false application
cases for a given general term in the case of vagueness, on this account, is explainable
in terms of borderline cases, whose existence implies that there is no cut-off point
between definitely true and definitely false application cases. Major figures in the phi-
losophy of vagueness such as Russell or Dummett famously suggested that in cases
of genuine vagueness, vagueness reemerges indefinitely for associated definitisations
(definitely red, definitely definitely red, definitely definitely definitely red, etc.).1 This
notion of non-terminating higher-order vagueness has been challenged though by var-
ious impossibility results to the effect that vagueness in this sense is impossible. Kit
Fine presents a novel account of the conceptual problem of higher-order vagueness,
which involves a new non-classical logic for vagueness. On Fine’s account, the essen-
tial flaw in previous approaches is the idea that vagueness is a local notion that can
be described in terms of borderline cases. Rather, he argues, vagueness in the genuine
informal sense is a global notion, which applies not to single application cases, but to
sets of application cases that are under consideration in a context.
Vague predicates seem to be tolerant with respect to relevant dimensions of varia-
tion, in the sense that they do not distinguish between sufficiently similar individuals
in a domain. Peter Pagin’s central gap semantics offers a model of vagueness that
accommodates tolerance as a valid principle. The basic idea is to interpret predi-
cates together with a contextually given quantifier domain restriction. Each restriction
involves a central gap (with respect to the relevant dimension of variation), which
makes tolerance safe from contradiction. Whilst in earlier work by Pagin, this idea is
formalised for simple languages of predicate logic, in his contributed paper, the idea
is further developed for languages in which definite truth is expressible. On Pagin’s
account, definitisations of predications come with an increment in the required gap
between true and false applications. The presented framework offers a new model of
higher-order vagueness, and with it, also a new perspective on related impossibility
results.
2. Probabilistic models of vagueness. The label ‘degree theories for vagueness’ is
an umbrella term for continued-valued semantics, which evaluate vague languages in
terms of reals in the unit interval [0,1]. There is no common ground on the supposed
structure of degrees. Whilst some authors (most notably, Edgington) have proposed
structural constraints that are genuinely probabilistic, proponents of fuzzy seman-
tics have argued that degrees obey compositionality principles which (in some way
or other) generalise the classical truth-value tables for logical connectives that are
adopted on bivalent semantics. Some implications of compositional degree semantics
for vagueness have been received with fervid criticism. For example, if degrees are
truth-value functional, it is suggested that contradictions of the form P and not P
receive a positive value if P has a positive value lower than 1—an implication that has
been criticised as blatantly counterintuitive. In his contribution, Nicholas J.J. Smith
1 Russell (1923), Dummett (1959).
123
Synthese
takes a closer look at the major variants of the objection to fuzzy semantics from
truth-functionality. The gist of his argument is that this objection can be put to rest,
whatever position one may take on the relevance and soundness of alleged data that
seem to conflict with truth-value functionality: either, the relevance of data (including
the individual intuitions of single philosophers) can be in general disputed, or the
data as such can be disputed, or they can be even accommodated by way of fuzzy
semanticist tools.
On the classical model of subjective probability, the credence (for a sentence or
proposition) can be interpreted as measure of expectation of (its semantic value being)
truth.2 More generally, allowing for the case that sentences may take any value in the
unit interval and not merely the extremal values 0 and 1, one can interpret credence
as measuring the expected semantic value. Importantly, depending on which semantic
framework we adopt for modelling credence as an expected semantic value, we may
end upwith different accounts of the structure of credence. In some of his earlier work,
Smith adopts this idea formotivating an account of rational credence that deviates from
classical probability constraints.3 In her contributed paper, Rosanna Keefe makes a
case against Smith’s account of credence. She challenges not only the adequacy of
his particular model. She urges considerations even more against the general idea that
formal semantics may provide a sufficient basis for modelling credence as an expected
semantic value.
Degree theories of the probabilistic variety are of special theoretical interest in
that they provide a unified solution strategy for the Sorites, Lottery, and Preface para-
doxes.4 The question of what degrees are supposed to be more specifically, and why
they should have a probabilistic structure, however, has been receiving only most
recently due attention. Dan Lassiter and Noah D. Goodman offer a positive account
of degrees for scalar adjectives (such as tall or happy), which is a prominent type of
vague expressions. The basic idea is that listeners and speakers maintain probabilistic
models of each other’s utterance and interpretive choice behaviour. These models are
leveraged for making choices that are most useful for the communicative purposes on
either part. Specifically, on Lassiter’s and Goodman’s particular model, degrees are
rational credences that model the uncertainty of listeners with regard to the intended
information of utterances of the relevant sentence. Their theory brings to bear recent
work on Bayesian pragmatics, which combine Gricean and game-theoretic influences
with an approach to inference and decision-making under uncertainty which has been
influential in recent cognitive science.
Paul Egré presents and defends a different type of probabilistic degree theory of
vague judgements, which is inspired by an idea of Emile Borel’s. On that account,
judgements involving vague predicates involve a two-stage mental mechanism: first,
mapping a stimulus (e.g. somemagnitude of height, brightness, loudness, or other) onto
an inner scale of magnitude, which provides a mental representation of that magnitude
2 For convenience, we will switch here occasionally between sentences and propositions on the one hand,
and events, on the other hand, as objects of probability assignments. None of the points mentioned here





with some approximation; second, comparing that representation to a distinguished
value, which can be understood as a threshold value for mental representations to be
categorised in a certain way. As Egré shows, this idea can be formalised in terms of
signal detection theory,which is amajor theory of imperfect discrimination.According
this, judging as to whether an object is tall involves essentially the same sort of mental
mechanism that is also involved in cases where a subject has to detect the presence of
a signal in a background of white noise.
The contributions by Igor Douven and Masaki Ichinose explore various ways of
bringing probabilistic degrees fruitfully to bear to particular philosophical problems
involving vagueness. As Douven shows, probability logic not only offers a useful tool
of modelling the Sorites, Lottery, and Preface paradoxes; it may be also adopted for a
newaccount of theTheseus’s Ship paradox,which is a paradox ofmaterial constitution.
Specifically, it is shown how Edgington’s degree-theoretic account strategy for the
Sorites carries over to Theseus’s Ship. In effect, the paradox can be resolved in a way
which is almost non-revisionary, in the sense that the recommended remedy is just a
mild restriction of some inferential rules involved.
Ichinose’s paper models the vague distinction between descriptivity and normativ-
ity in probabilistic terms. According to this, descriptivity and normativity may come
in degrees that have a probabilistic structure: claims may be descriptive to some pos-
itive degree, and at the same time be normative to some positive degree. Ichinose
furthermore suggests a model of the way in normativity and descriptivity degrees are
supposed to relate to each other.
3. Indeterminacy and vagueness of credence. Orthodox probabilistic models of cre-
dence describe states of information by way of some probability function, which
assigns to any event in a logical space a single real value, even in cases where there
seems to be no warrant for such a determinate attitude. E.g., what should our rational
degree of belief be that the global mean surface temperature will have risen by more
than four degrees by 2070? Should it be 0.75? And how about 0.75000001? Or 0.74?
It seems that there is no warrant for saying that our available evidence warranted a
particular credence functions. Rather, it seems more appropriate to say that credences
may be imprecise. More precisely, one may say that doxastic states should be rather
modelled in terms of credal sets, which may contain more than one credal function.
It has been suggested that cases of imprecision in probability may vary in nature: in
epistemic instances, there is a fact of the matter as to which precise probability regard-
ing an event is to be assigned relative to a doxastic state, it is just due to the imperfect
introspectability of this state that there is no warrant for assigning any such value for
this event. In non-epistemic instances, on the other hand, there is just no fact of the
matter that would determine a precise probability.5
One may have various sorts of motivation for adopting an imprecise probability
approach. One motivation is the idea that probability orderings can be incomplete.
5 Following Walley (1991), I use imprecise probabilities here as an umbrella term to cover various sorts
of indeterminacy in probability. There are more restricted ways of using this term though. Most notably, in
his seminal paper Levi (1985), Levi reserves the term imprecise probabilities for imperfectly introspected




Specifically, it has been suggested that there are cases of incommensurability in com-
parisons in probability: e.g., our expectation of rain, when we start out for walk, may
sometimes be neither more likely than not, nor less likely than not, nor as likely as
not—just because different parts of evidence may point into opposite directions (the
barometer reading may be high, but the clouds be black).6 As in the related discussion
on value relations, it is controversial whether there are cases of genuine incommen-
surability in comparisons in probability: to wit, one may suggest explaining supposed
cases of incommensurability away as cases where in fact it is only vague whether
one event is more likely than, less likely than, or as likely as another one.7 Wlodek
Rabinowicz’s supervaluationist intersection account offers a novel model of probabil-
ity relations. It not only accommodates the distinction between incommensurability
and vagueness, but introduces even more refined distinctions that go beyond what
could be modelled in previous accounts. The basic idea of Rabinowicz’s model is to
model being likelier/less likely/as likely as as being higher than/lower than/equal to
in credence respectively, for all members of permissible credence assignments.
Anothermotivation for imprecise probabilitymodels is the idea that credence should
reflect evidence. E.g., compare a casewhere a coin is known to be fairwith a casewhere
a coin of unknown bias is tossed, and consider in either case the hypotheses that the
coin lands heads (H ) with the hypothesis that it lands tails (T ). For either case, it seems
appropriate to have, on balance, the same belief in both H and T . However, at the same
time, it seems that the evidence in the first case hasmoreweight. Oneway ofmodelling
this intuitive difference between evidential balance and weight is to represent the
said cases by different probability assignments P(H ) = {0.5} and P(H ) = [0, 1],
respectively.8 Aidan Lyon argues for an even more refined imprecise probabilities
model of credence. The crucial point is that doxastic states may be genuinely fuzzy
in the sense that they cannot be fully adequately represented in terms of a single
credence function, but equally, they cannot be adequately represented in terms of a
single credence set. Rather, according to Lyon, in cases of genuine fuzziness, credal
functions can be at best only assigned intermediate degrees of membership in one’s
credal set. The presented fuzzy credal set account provides a more refined toolbox of
modelling the balance and weight of evidence.
Agents’ credences, typically, represent reality only imperfectly—if they were
perfectly accurate, they should take the maximal value for all and only all truths.
Notwithstanding the actual inaccuracy of agents’ credences, the question is whether
their credences may possibly meet certain standards of accuracy, in the sense that
their possible credences may represent actual facts accurately in the perfect sense,
or at least to some sufficient degree. Eleonora Cresto discusses the question of what
follows if this question was answered in the positive. The gist of her discussion is
that modal constraints on the accuracy of credence with respect to actual facts may
have non-trivial formal implications on admissible credence assignments for logically
6 Keynes (1921).
7 This way of distinguishing between incommensurability and vagueness generalises an established tech-
nical distinction for value relations to the case of probability relations. For the related discussion in value




contingent propositions (such as it rains and one’s degree of confidence that it rains
is not smaller than 50 percent). This discussion closely ties with discussions of the
knowability paradox (in epistemic logic) and of the reflection principle (in formal
epistemology). In effect, while violations of the reflection principle are shown to be
coherent, certain probabilistic versions of the knowability paradox do arise. Cresto’s
framework of modal logic for a language containing probability functions is broad
in scope, allowing for a unified discussion of—and maybe, a unified solution to—the
paradox of knowability and its probabilistic relatives.
4. Foundations of probability. Conditional wisdom has it that conditional probabilities
are by definition certain ratios of unconditional probabilities, and that probabilistic
independence is defined in terms of unconditional probabilities (taking the product of
the relevant joint unconditional probabilities). Alan Hájek and Branden Fitelson argue
that there are good reasons to put this conventional wisdom to rest, andwith it, the stan-
dard (Kolmogorovian) approach to probability and independence. On their account,
more promising options of modelling independence are available in a more general
framework of conditional probability, where conditional probabilities are allowed to
be defined also if conditions take an unconditional probability zero. In effect, Hájek’s
and Fitelson’s case for a non-standard approach to independence is, by the same token,
a case for a non-standard (Popperian) framework of probability.
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